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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
An employment practice which has a disproportionate impact on women and cannot 
be ‘justified’ amounts to indirect sex discrimination under s 1(1)(b), Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA). It may also be unlawful under European Community 
law, in particular A 141 (equal pay) and the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207). The 
same formula is used to define indirect racial discrimination in s 1(1)(b), Race 
Relations Act 1976 (RRA). In Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College the Court 
of Appeal scrutinised the meaning of ‘justified’ under the SDA. This is important for 
employers because the precise definition dictates how onerous their burden is to 
justify a challenged employment practice. This case concerned in particular 
justification where (i) less-discriminatory alternative measures existed to achieve the 
same goal and (ii) the employer's defence itself was based on discrimination. 
 
Accrington & Rossendale College employed 341 part-time lecturers on successive 
one-year contracts. In 1996 legislation came into force obliging the College to afford 
to their part-time lecturers equal benefits to those given to their full-time lecturers. 
(Although not specified by the EAT or the CA this was presumably the Employment 
Protection (Part-Time Employees) Regulations 1995, passed in response to R v Sec of 
State for Employment, ex p EOC [1994] 1 All ER 910, where the House of Lords held 
that existing legislation prescribing inferior rights to part-time workers was 
incompatible with superior Community sex discrimination law.) Faced with the extra 
expense the College responded by terminating the contracts with all its part-time 
lecturers and re-employing them as sub-contractors, through an agency. As a 
consequence the part-timers were paid less and lost a series of benefits (eg sick pay). 
Ms Allonby, a part-time lecturer, brought several actions against the College. One 
was for indirect sex discrimination. 
 
In the employment tribunal Ms Allonby proved her prima facie case that the new 
arrangement had caused a disparate impact on women, who made up some two-thirds 
of the part-time lecturers, but only about half of the full-timers. And so the dismissals 
fell disproportionately upon women. However the tribunal found that the new 
arrangement was justified for two reasons. First, to save money, estimated at about 
£13,000 per year. Second, to impose control over the hiring of part-time staff, which 
had in the past been left to individual team leaders. The tribunal also noted that ‘any 
decision taken for sound business reasons would inevitably affect one group more 
than another group.’ The Employment Appeal Tribunal agreed with that decision and 
Ms Allonby appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the College had failed to 
justify the measures because (i) less-discriminatory alternative measures existed to 
achieve the College's goals, and (ii) the measures were themselves based on 
discrimination. 
 
 
2. THE LAW AND DECISION 
 
In the Court of Appeal Sedley, LJ gave the leading judgement. He first alluded to the 
equal pay case Bilka Kauffhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1987] ICR 110, where (at 
126) the European Court of Justice held that a disparity in pay could be justified if (a) 
the policy corresponded to a real need, and (b) was suitable to achieve the goal, and 
(c) was necessary to achieve the goal. Sedley, LJ then cited the ‘objective balance’ 
test from Hampson v Department of Education [1989] ICR 179 (at 191): ‘"justifiable" 
[from s1, SDA] requires an objective balance between the discriminatory effect of the 
condition and the reasonable needs of the party who applies the condition.’ Sedley’s, 
LJ conclusion of the law was that to justify the practice the College had to 
demonstrate a real need and show that this was not outweighed by its discriminatory 
effect upon women (at para. 29). 
 
Having stated the law, Sedley, LJ found that the tribunal had erred in two respects. 
First, they did not consider any ‘fairly obvious’ alternative measures short of 
dismissal to save money and gain control over the hiring of part-time staff. The 
second (and 'major') error was that the tribunal, by accepting that any arrangement 
would inevitably have a discriminatory effect, disabled itself from applying the 
‘objective balance’ test, that is weighing the effect of the measure against the 
College’s needs. Accordingly the case was remitted to the employment tribunal for 
reconsideration. 
 
3. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Bilka and Hampson reconciled 
Sedley’s, LJ reconciliation of Bilka and Hampson could be interpreted in two ways. 
First, that Bilka and Hampson were two stages of a compound definition of 
justification. We decide first if there was a ‘real need’ (Bilka) and second, if its 
discriminatory effect outweighed the College’s needs (Hampson). This is an unlikely 
interpretation though. Sedley, LJ quoted Lord Nicholls in Barry v Midland Bank 
[1999] ICR 859 HL, (at 870): ‘The more serious the disparate impact on women...the 
more cogent must be the objective justification.’ This said Sedley, LJ, ‘amplified’ the 
Hampson test. Although Sedley, LJ failed to mention that Lord Nicholls was 
discussing the Community Law principle of proportionality (Hampson was not cited 
in Barry), we must assume that, Sedley, LJ (and Lord Nicholls) was equating the 
Hampson 'objective balance' test with the principle of proportionality. This 
undermines the theory that Sedley, LJ was crafting a two-stage test. This is because 
the principle of proportionality is inherent in the Bilka test, which demands that a 
measure must be ‘suitable’ and ‘necessary’ to achieve the goal. Proportionality, or 
Hampson, cannot work as a separate test. An employer who has shown that a practice 
was suitable and necessary, has at the same time shown that it was proportionate. It 
would be absurd to ask again, was it suitable and necessary?  And in cases where an 
employer had failed to show that a practice was suitable and necessary, a separate 
question of proportionality would be pointless. 
 
So we must accept the second interpretation, that Hampson merely reflects parts (b) 
and (c) of the Bilka test. This is the neatest integration yet of the Bilka and Hampson 
‘tests’. Hitherto, British courts have done no more than treat the tests as expressing 
the same thing in different language. (See for instance Balcombe, LJ in Hampson, 
who (at 34) traced his ‘objective balance’ test to Bilka via the decision in Rainey v 
Greater Glasgow Health Bd [1987] AC 224 HL; the House of Lords approved this in 
Webb v EMO [1992] 4 All ER 929, at 936.) 
 
 
B. Alternative Measures 
 
However, Sedley's, LJ assimilation of Bilka - or more precisely proportionality - and 
Hampson is not perfect. The obvious difference is in the language. The word 
'necessary' appears nowhere in the Hampson test. But there is a difference in 
substance as well. Asking if a practice is suitable and necessary is different from 
asking whether it is outweighed by its discriminatory effect. This becomes clear 
where, as Ms Allonby argued, there exists an alternative. Under Hampson the 
existence of a less-discriminatory alternative practice achieving the same goal is 
merely an ingredient in the 'balance' test; under Bilka it will always defeat a 
justification defence. The case of Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1994] 1 All 
ER 495 illustrates the point. 
In Enderby the Health Authority was trying to justify a difference in pay between 
speech therapists (98 per cent female) and pharmacists (63 per cent female). The 
pharmacists were paid about 40 per cent more than the speech therapists. As women 
were over-represented in the lower paid group the Health Authority were obliged to 
justify the difference. It argued that market forces caused the difference. But the 
evidence was that only an extra ten per cent pay was needed to recruit a sufficient 
number of pharmacists. Thus there existed a less-discriminatory alternative of paying 
the pharmacists a ten per cent premium. The ECJ held (at para 27): 'If...the National 
Court has been able to determine precisely what proportion of the increase in pay is 
attributable to market forces, it must necessarily accept that that the pay differential is 
objectively justified to the extent of that proportion.' In other words, proportionality 
means no more than necessary. 
If we applied the Hampson 'objective balance' test to the facts of Enderby the result 
may be different. On the one hand there is the 40 per cent difference in pay, on the 
other, the need for sufficient pharmacists. Given that stark choice, a tribunal could 
easily hold that the difference in pay was justified. Indeed that was the result in the 
EAT in Enderby [1991] ICR 382. 
Case law history also demonstrates that the British judiciary understood that there was 
a lower standard of justification than Bilka. In the early years of the British 
legislation, tribunals (influenced by US case law, upon which our legislation was 
based), spoke of ‘necessity’. For example, in Steel v Union of Post Office Workers 
[1978] ICR 181, Phillips, J, President of the EAT, said, (at 187) that the practice must 
be inter alia ‘genuine and necessary’. 
In 1982, however, the Court of Appeal in Ojutiku v Manpower Services Commission 
[1982] ICR 661 contrasted the word 'necessary' with the statutory word 'justified'; 
Kerr, LJ stated (at 670) that ‘justifiable...clearly applies a lower standard 
than...necessary’. Eveleigh, LJ considered (at 668) it to mean ‘something...acceptable 
to right-thinking people as sound and tolerable.’ Balcombe, LJ in Hampson retrieved 
the situation somewhat with his ‘objective justification’ test. However, he did not 
restore the standard to the pre-Ojutiku position. Otherwise he would have simply used 
the word ‘necessary’. Obvious support for a lower standard lies in the legislative 
history. The RRA and SDA use the term ‘justified’ rather than 'necessary'. In 
Parliament, the Government resisted amendments to the Sex Discrimination Bill that 
would have replaced 'justifiable' with 'necessary'. Lord Harris stated that where a body 
offered reduced fares for pensioners, the policy might be justifiable, but not necessary 
(362 HL Deb 14 July 1975 cols 10116-17). 
  
Meanwhile, the ECJ was developing its jurisprudence on indirect discrimination. The 
Bilka test expressly demanded that any measure should be ‘necessary’ to achieve the 
goal. The existence of a less-discriminatory alternative will defeat a defence of 
justification. However, under Hampson, the mere existence of a less-discriminatory 
alternative is not enough to defeat a defence. As Enderby (above) illustrates, if the 
discriminatory effect of the disputed measure is ‘outweighed’ by the employer’s 
needs, then the defence will succeed, no matter haw many less-discriminatory 
alternatives exist. This approach slowly permeated the British cases until the Court of 
Appeal in Hampson felt compelled to reconcile it with the British position.  
 
A similar uncertainty has dogged American case law. In the seminal US Supreme 
Court case Griggs v Duke Power (1971) 401 US 424, Burger, CJ stated (at 431): ‘The 
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude 
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.’ 
However, later he said (at 432):  'Congress has placed on the employer the burden of 
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the 
employment in question.' Here we have two standards (‘business necessity’ and 
‘manifest relationship’) in the same speech. Subsequent Supreme Court 
pronouncements have vacillated between the two, giving for instance, ‘significant 
correlation’ and ‘necessary’. (From respectively Albermarle Paper v Moody 1975 422 
US 405, at 431 and Dothard v Rawlinson 1977 433 US 321, at 331.) This uncertainty 
was codified by the Civil Rights Act 1991, which stated that a practice must be ‘job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.' (42 USCS 
s. 2000e-2, (k)(1)(A)(i)).  
 
However, different standards of justification in the United States matter little where 
alternatives exist because the Supreme Court has developed a separate ‘alternative 
practice’ doctrine. A plaintiff may defeat a justification defence by proposing an 
alternative business practice which has a less (or no) discriminatory effect. The rubric 
generally used was set in Albermarle Paper Co v Moody (422 US 405, at 425): the 
alternative should ‘also serve the employer's legitimate interest in “efficient and 
trustworthy workmanship.”’ 
None of this is to say that British courts will refuse to consider alternatives in the 
justification debate. Sedley's, LJ judgement was not as clear-cut as that. Indeed the 
Court of Appeal remitted Allonby's case for reconsideration because, among other 
things, the tribunal had not considered the ‘obvious’ alternatives open to the College. 
Of course asking a tribunal to 'consider' an alternative in the 'balance' test is different 
from ruling that the mere existence of an alternative will defeat the justification 
defence. Sedley's, LJ judgement further departs from Bilka with his attendant 
comments. He noted (at para. 28) that the tribunal had failed ‘to evaluate...whether the 
dismissals were reasonably necessary - a test which, while of course not demanding 
indispensability, requires proof of a real need’. Here Sedley, LJ has diluted Bilka by 
qualifying ‘necessary’ with ‘reasonably necessary’ and not indispensable. He spoke 
only of obvious alternatives. This is the language of compromise. One can only 
conclude that he intended a broad-brush approach. Tribunals should only consider 
‘fairly obvious’ alternatives. This deepens the impression (eg given in Ojutiku and 
Hampson) that the English courts will apply Bilka in form only, whilst actually 
subjecting employers to the lower Hampson standard of justification. 
 
Finally, this does not mean that the difference between Hampson and Bilka is merely 
a matter of degree. It is a fundamental difference. The compromise in the Hampson 
test upsets the theory of indirect discrimination. Where a practice having a disparate 
impact is shown to be absolutely necessary to achieve a genuine non-discriminatory 
goal, then the cause of the disparate impact lies elsewhere. No action lies against the 
employer. The cause(s) of any disparate impact can only be identified if the courts 
impose a strict test of necessity. A lesser standard gives employers leeway to 
discriminate and blurs the causes of a disparate impact. As Enderby's case illustrates, 
'excess' disparate impact amounts to discrimination. Further, a strict test of necessity 
forces employers to eliminate discriminatory employment practices, which by their 
nature, are inefficiencies. The irony is that as many men as women, and far more 
whites than non-whites, would benefit from that.  
 
 
C. Defence Based On Sex 
 
Ms Allonby's alternative argument suggested that where the measure was based on 
discrimination, it could never be justified. It will be recalled that the dismissals were a 
response to the Employment Protection (Part-Time Employees) Regulations 1995, 
which were passed in deference to Community sex discrimination law. One reason for 
remitting the case given by Sedley, LJ was that: ‘In particular there is no recognition 
[by the tribunal] that if the aim of the dismissal was itself discriminatory...it could 
never afford justification.’ (At para. 29) Surprisingly, the judge said no more than that 
on the issue. 
 
Ms Allonby cited R v Sec of State, ex p EOC [1994] 1 All ER 910 and R v Sec of 
State, ex p Seymour-Smith [1999] All ER (EC) 97. In Ex p EOC (the case that led to 
the Regulations) Lord Keith held (at 922) that the existing Regulations that afforded 
lesser benefits to part-time workers constituted a ‘gross breach of the principle of 
equal pay and could not be possibly regarded as a suitable means of achieving an 
increase in part-time employment.’ In ex p Seymour-Smith the ECJ, when giving a 
ruling on justification, stated (at para 75) that a Government measure ‘cannot have the 
effect of frustrating the implementation of a fundamental principle of Community law 
such as that of equal pay...’  
 
Those cases concerned Government measures made in pursuance of a social policy. In 
such cases the ECJ allows a Government a ‘broad margin of discretion’ (see eg ex p 
Seymour-Smith at para 74), which is less onerous than the Bilka test. In Allonby the 
‘measure’ (ie dismissals) was taken by a College employer and should be judged by 
the stricter Bilka standard. The express aim of the measure was to give 
(predominantly female) part-time lecturers less benefits and pay. That too was a gross 
breach of the fundamental principle of equal pay and accordingly should never be 
justified. On this point alone Ms Allonby should prevail. 
  
There lies a related line of argument here. Section 1(1)(b), SDA provides that the 
measure must be justified ‘irrespective’ of sex. According to the ECJ the measures 
must be ‘explained by factors which exclude any discrimination on grounds of sex.’ 
(See Jenkins v Kingsgate [1981] 1 WLR 973 (at para 13) and Bilka (at para 29.) The 
dismissals were made in response to the Regulations of 1995 passed to afford equal 
benefits to part-time workers because they are predominantly female. The reports are 
vague as to the relationship between the stated goals - to save money and control the 
hiring of part-time lecturers - and the introduction of the Regulations. In the EAT 
(EAT/1081/98, Transcript) Lindsay’s, J sole observation was (at para. 6): ‘The 
College took the view that the costs attendant upon recent changes in the law as to 
part-time workers were too high for it’. In the Court of Appeal, Sedley, LJ noted only 
(at para. 3) that things had become ‘financially more onerous because of legislative 
changes which required part-time lecturers to be afforded equal...benefits to full-time 
lecturers.’ 
 
It can be said, at the least, the new Regulations were the background of the dismissals. 
The question is, were the dismissals unrelated to sex? The immediate goal was to save 
money and gain control over hiring part-time staff. In Orphanos v Queen Mary 
College [1985] 2 All ER 233 the plaintiff challenged a requirement to be three-years 
ordinarily resident within the European Community, so to be exempt from full 
overseas student fees. The immediate goal for the requirement was to curtail public 
expenditure on education. The House of Lords held (at 239-230) that the requirement 
was ‘so closely related’ to nationality that it could not be justified and amounted to 
indirect racial discrimination. In Allonby the dismissals of a predominantly female 
group were inspired by Regulations aimed to afford equal benefits to women. It is at 
least arguable that the requirement is ‘so closely related’ to sex that it should not be 
justifiable. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This case was remitted because the tribunal failed to apply any sort of objective test of 
justification. The tribunal's failure to consider an alternative was evidence of this and 
no more. The Court of Appeal did not recommend that the justification defence 
necessarily should fail because there was a 'fairly obvious' alternative. This reveals 
that the Court of Appeal did not apply the Bilka standard, only the lower Hampson 
one. 
 
Allonby follows a series of cases in our senior courts (eg Hampson, Barry, Webb) 
where a 'balance' test has been equated with the principle of proportionality, first set 
out in Bilka. Clearly Hampson does not reflect fully the proportionality principle, 
which means no more than necessary. The effect of this is notable where there exists 
a less-discriminatory alternative able to achieve the employer's goal. Under Bilka, the 
mere existence of one will defeat a justification defence; Enderby illustrates that. But 
according to Allonby, only 'obvious' alternatives qualify to be balanced against the 
'reasonable' and 'not indispensable' needs of the employer. This less onerous test 
upsets the theory of indirect discrimination by sanctioning a certain amount of 
discrimination and blurring its cause(s). It also weakens the attack on business 
inefficiencies that benefits all.  
 
As the law stands, the existence of less-discriminatory alternative practice achieving 
the same goal will, under EU legislation and in the United States, defeat a defence of 
justification. However, under domestic legislation an alternative practice is merely an 
ingredient in a 'balance' test. Where the claimant can identify an alternative practice 
they would be well advised to bring their claim under EU legislation, where possible.  
 
Employers are obliged to justify a disparate impact under A141, the Equal Treatment 
Directive (76/207), the Equal Pay Act 1970, the SDA and RRA. Balcombe, LJ stated 
in Hampson (at 192) that it was 'obviously desirable that the tests of justifiability in 
applied in all these closely related fields should be consistent with each other'. Clearly 
they are not. Yet there is no excuse for this state of affairs. British courts are not 
bound by Parliamentary debates and so can disregard the Government's apparent 
intended meaning of the word 'justified'. Parliament clearly intends that domestic law 
is consistent with EU law. The Bilka test could easily be read into the statutory term 
'justified'. This would not be straining statutory words; after all, for years the British 
courts for years have been purporting to do this. In addition there is the doctrine of 
indirect effect (to construe, where possible, domestic statutes consistent with EU law) 
to bolster them. 
 
Finally, it was surprising that the Court of Appeal made no comment on the law cited 
to support Ms Allonby's alternative argument that a defence based on discrimination 
could never succeed. Could this be an early sign of another long-running difference 
between UK and EU discrimination law? 
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